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Abstract
We explore the structure and dynamics of interbank exposures in Brazil using
a unique data set of all mutual exposures of nancial institutions in Brazil, as
well as their capital reserves, at various periods in 2007 and 2008. We show
that the network of exposures can be adequately modeled as a directed scale-
free (weighted) graph with heavy-tailed degree and weight distributions. We also
explore the relationship between connectivity of a nancial institution and its
capital buer. Finally, we use the network structure to explore the extent of
systemic risk generated in the system by the individual institutions.
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31 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has emphasized the importance of systemic risk, dened as
macro-level risk which can inuence the entire stability of a nancial system. Control
over systemic risk has been the main motivation of the recent bailouts of large nancial
institutions in United States. Regulators have had great diculties anticipating the
impact of defaults partly due to a lack of both visibility and relevant indicators on the
structure of the nancial system. Therefore the focus on Too big to fail, maybe is not
the right criterion, but contribution to nancial stability and possibility for contagion
could be better ones, i.e., Too interconnected to fail, see Grin (2008). Availability of
better indicators of systemic risk would have greatly helped formulating a consistent
approach to bailout. Elsinger et al. (2006), Furne (2003), Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
Upper and Worms (2004), Wells (2004). In particular, Elsinger et al. (2004).
Section 2 provides details about the nancial institutions and details about expo-
sures and capitals comprising the data sets. Section 3 provides an empirical analysis
of the topology of the interbank network for the Brazilian Financial System. As far as
we know this is the rst study to provide a full detailed description of the interbank
topology considering only real data. Most of the studies so far have either focused on
clearing nancial systems, e.g.,  Agnes Lubl oy (2006), Iori et al. (2008), Cajueiro and
Tabak (2008), Rrdam and Bech (2009) or considered incomplete sets of data, Elsinger
et al. (2004), Upper and Worms (2004), Degryse and Nguyen (2007), thereupon, com-
pleting the data set with methods such as maximizing entropy or cross-entropy. An
interesting approach was suggested by Elsinger et al. (2006), where the analysis of inter-
bank network was extended to other sources of risk, such as the credit and market risks
originated from non-nancial institutions. However, it was required many assumptions
regarding the estimation of the data set. In Section 4, we study the relationship between
capital reserves and exposures. We propose a linear model for the concept of capital
buer and provide additional insights for the distribution behavior of residuals of the
model proposed, therefore, complementing the previous section. Section 5 is mainly
concerned with systemic risk. We identify the impact of contagion if any particular
bank fails with its obligations with respect to other nancial institutions. To analyze
contagion in this context, we dene what is default in terms of tier I and tier II capital.
This is crucial and many authors usually don't give it the proper importance, hence,
considering unrealistic assumptions, Mistrulli (2007), Cont and Moussa (2009). In this
section, we extend the systemic risk analysis incorporating other sources of risk, such
as market, credit and liquidity risks. Section 6 provides the conclusions for the study.
42 Data Description
2.1 Mutual Exposures
The Brazilian Financial System encompassed 2,400 nancial institutions chartered by
Banco Central do Brasil. Table 1 shows that the number of nancial institutions of Type
I and Type II are less than of type III. Type I banking institutions have commercial
portfolios, and Type II represent all other banking institutions excluding Type III
which are subject to particular regulations. Despite their reduced number, nancial
institutions of Type I and II accounts for the majority of total assets in the Brazilian
Financial System (close to 98%), see Table 2. This is intuitive, since the majority of
nancial institutions that are of our interest are considered as either Type I or II, such
as multiple banks, savings banks, investment banks, development banks, and other
security brokerage or distribution companies. In addition, the majority of Type I and
Type II nancial institutions, which can be seen as a good proxy of the Brazilian
Financial System, are mainly held by private capital (approximately 70%) and operate
as a nancial conglomerate (approximately 75%).
Since most of the nancial institutions belong to a conglomerate, it is quite mean-
ingful to analyze contagion from a consolidated perspective because funds and liquidity
are managed as if all aliated nancial institutions are only one. To cope with this fact,
we consider only consolidated information for nancial conglomerates. The account-
ing standards for consolidation of nancial statements were established by Resolutions
2,723 and 2,743, BCB (2000a,b), and they are very similar to IASB and FASB direc-
tives. If we regard nancial institutions of Type I and II as conglomerates, the number
of institutions is reduced substantially.
In summary, our database considers 6 dates, i.e., June 2007, December 2007, March
2008, June 2008, September 2008 and November 2008. The interbank exposures for all
nancial conglomerates contemplate all sources risk, that is, xed-income instruments
(certicate of deposits and debentures), borrowing and lending (credit risk), derivatives
(including over-the-counter instruments such as swaps) and foreign exchange (curren-
cies). It is important to note that all derivatives were accounted by their market prices
when available, or fair value when a model-based valuation is required. It is also im-
portant to remark that all the exposures represent real operations.
52.2 Capital Reserves
We consider three types of capital, as dened in the guidelines provided by Basel Accord
I, BIS (1988), that is, the Required Capital Cr, the Capital tier I C1 and the Reference
Capital C2.1
Considering both the Brazilian legal system and the types of nancial instruments
Brazilian banks have access to build their capitals, Banco Central do Brasil, in accor-
dance with the Basel I and II Accords, issued Resolution 3,444, BCB (2007a), deter-
mining that banks compute tier I Capital as the accounting concept of shareholder's
equity plus net income (loss), deducted by redeemed preferred stocks, capital and reval-
uation of xed assets reserves, deferred taxes, and non-realized gains (losses), such as
mark-to-market adjustments from securities registered as available-for-sale and hedge
accounting. Eligible tier II Capital is equal to the sum of these same deductions, ex-
cepted for the deferred taxes, in addition to complex or hybrid capital instruments and
subordinated debt. Reference Capital is just the sum of tier I and tier II capitals.
The Required Capital is a function of the associated risks regarding each nancial
institution's operations, whether registered in their balance sheets (assets and liabilities)
or not (o-balance sheet transactions), as dened in Resolution 3,490, BCB (2007b).
Roughly speaking, the Required Capital Cr, can be computed as
Cr =   Risk Base; (1)
where the  is the minimum required Basel Index and Risk Base is the sum of the
following components: credit exposures weighted by their respective risk; foreign cur-
rencies and gold exposures; interest rate exposures; commodity prices exposures; stocks
prices exposures; and, operational risk exposures. It is important to remark not only
that these exposures include all the nancial conglomerate counterparties, including
corporations, mutual and hedge funds, individuals and government, but also that the
maximum allowable leverage for the Brazilian nancial institutions is approximately
9.10, instead of 12.50. This last observation is a consequence of the minimum required
Basel Index of  = 0:11 which is dierent from the American nancial system which
requires a minimum Basel Index of  = 0:08 for its nancial institutions.
1Brazil is in the process of implementing the Basel II Accord guidelines, BIS (2005). Signicant
changes will occur mostly in required capital methodology, and not in tier I and tier II eligible capitals.
Nonetheless, netting exposures, as contemplated in the Basel II Accord, is still not allowable by
Brazilian legislation for most nancial operations.
63 Interbank Network Topology
3.1 Network Representation
We could view the interbank system as a directed network  t for t = 1;2;:::;T.
The interbank system  t is dened as the triplet  t = (Vt;Lt;Ct), where the vertices
Vt = f1;2;:::;ntg are the existing nancial conglomerates on time t, the matrix Lt
of dimension nt  nt represents the exposures among these nancial institutions and
Ct = fCr;C1;C2g is the capitalization structure. Each element `ij 2 Lt represents that
bank i has an exposure to bank j, that is, if all exposures should be cleared in time t,
bank i should receive from bank j the amount `ij.
From Lt, we may dene the adjacency matrix At of same dimension as Lt whose
elements are dened as the indicator function of the elements of the exposure matrix
Lt, that is aij = 1f`ij>0g for all aij 2 At. We may also represent the adjacency matrix
At as a vector Et of edges, listing the nancial conglomerates that are connected. The
elements are dened as positions of the elements of the adjacency matrix that are equal
to 1, that is, all the pairs f(i;j)g i;j 2 Vt for which aij = 1. This representation will
be useful for the clustering and mixing assortativity analysis in Subsection 3.5.
For a directed network the number of edges in respect to a vertice is denoted degrees
and depends on the direction of the exposure. The in-degree kin;i and out-degree kout;i








where Vin;i = fj : aij = 1g and Vout;i = fj : aji = 1g. Consequently, the degree
of nancial conglomerate i is equal to ki = kin;i + kout;i. From a statistical point of
view, the degree distribution of vertices plays a very important role to generate random
networks as shown in Subsection 3.2.
In a similar manner, the in-weighted degree win;i, out-weighted degree wout;i and








and wi = win;i + wout;i. The weighted degree distributions are analyzed in Subsection
3.3.
73.2 Connectivity
An important issue that has never been scrutinized in the nancial literature due to
the lack of available data for dierent dates is whether the distribution of in-degree,
out-degree and degree are stationary, that is, they do not change across time. 2
Hypothesis 1 (Distribution Stationarity of Degrees). The in-degree P(Kin 6 k), out
degree P(Kout 6 k) and degree P(K 6 k) distributions are stationary.
Figure 2 shows the Q-Q Plot of the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) P(K 6 k)
of the degree distributions of two networks for consecutive dates. It is easy to verify that
data are plotted around a 45 degree line, indicating that the degree distribution doesn't
change with time. The Komolgorov-Smirnov test between CDFs for consecutive dates,
see Massey Jr. (1951), can be written as KS = supk
   ^ Ft+1(k)   ^ Ft(k)
  , where ^ Ft(k) is
the empirical CDF of degrees in t = 1;2;:::;T 1. The p-values are all greater than 0.6,
suggesting that for relatively high levels of signicance the null hypothesis H0 cannot
be rejected. Therefore, this strongly supports that the connectivity structure of the
Brazilian interbank network is stable over time. This is not what would be expected,
since the data spanned over turbulent times, such as the years 2007 and 2008, where
nancial stability was a big issue.
Figures 3, 4 and 5 show, respectively, the log-log plot of the empirical complementary
cumulative distribution for in-degree ^ P(Kin > k), out-degrees ^ P(Kout > k), and degrees
^ P(K > k), for k > 1. It is possible to notice that above a particular threshold kmin
the distributions demonstrate a linear decay in the tail, suggesting a power-law nature
of the distribution. This property is typical of scale-free networks such as the World
Wide Web. For a comprehensive description of scale-free graphs see Albert-L asz o et al.
(2003) and Newman et al. (2006).
Hypothesis 2 (Power Distribution of the Tail of Degrees). The tail distributions of
in degrees P(Kin = kjk > kmin), out degrees P(Kout = kjk > kmin) and degrees P(K =
kjk > kmin) follow a discrete power law with parameters  and kmin dened as
P(K = kjk > kmin) =  k
 ; (4)
where
 = 1/(;kmin); (5)
2We dened connectivity in a narrow context, which comprises only degrees. However this denition
is not a consensus and other indicators that we explore latter in this paper, such as exposure size,
clustering and assortativity are also considered measures of connectivity.
8and  is the reciprocal of the Hurwitz (or Generalized) Riemann Zeta function (;kmin) =
P1
k=kmin k .
The power law distribution is characterized by the slope of the linear relation
log(P(K > k)jk > kmin) =  log(k) + c where c is a constant and  is called the
tail exponent. Applying the MLE approach introduced by Clauset et al. (2009), we
may jointly estimate the tail exponent  and the minimum threshold kmin by maximiz-
ing the likelihood function, see equation (25) in the Appendix.
Table 3 shows some statistics for the MLE estimates for in-degree, out-degree and
degree distributions' parameters ^  and ^ kmin. It is possible to see that the MLE estimate
ranges from 2 to 3. Although these results agree with those found for the Austrian
interbank network, see Elsinger et al. (2004), the Austrian network estimates did not
considered the joint estimate of  and kmin. They determined an arbitrary value for
kmin, which greatly impact the estimated value of .
It is important to notice that MLE estimates are not consistent in case of misspeci-
cation of the distribution for the data generating process underlying the tails of degrees.
Therefore, a better way to test the goodness-of-t of the power law distribution is inves-
tigating the null hypothesis H0 via Komolgorov-Smirnov test for CDF (cumulative dis-
tribution function) of a power law distribution, i.e., KS = supk>kmin
   ^ F(k)   F(kj;kmin)
  ,
where ^ F is the empirical CDF and F the power-law with parameters  and kmin. The
results in Figures 3, 4 and 5 provide ample evidence that that the power-law distribu-
tion null hypothesis should not be rejected. This is supported through the p-values of
KS test that are all greater than a 1% level of signicance for all distributions, except
for both June 2007 and September 2008 out-degrees distributions. Nevertheless, the
total degree for these same dates do not reject the null hypothesis.
3.3 Exposures' Sizes
Following the same pattern for degrees, the distribution of exposures indicates that
exposures also behave in accordance to the power law.
Hypothesis 3 (Power Distribution of the Exposures' Sizes). The tail of the distribution
for exposures dP(  Lij 6 `j` > `min) i;j 2 Vt follows a continuous power law with
parameters  and `min, i.e.,
dP(Lij 6 `j` > `min) =  `
 ; (6)
where  = (   1)`
 1
min.
9The last column of Table 3 shows some statistics of the MLE parameters (^ ; ^ `min)
estimates for the power law distribution of the exposures, see equation (27) in Appendix.
It is important to remark that for all in-exposures exist an analogous out-exposure, so
under this circumstance, the distribution of in and out exposures are equal. The only
dierence is how this exposures are allocated among the banks, that is, how we allocate
these exposures within the rows and columns of matrix Lt. Following the same modus
operandi for the degrees' tail distribution, Figure 6 shows that under a 1% level of
signicance it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that the exposures for all
dates are generated by a power law distribution.
3.4 Relationship between exposure size and connectivity
Another important property that we shall probe is the relationship between degrees and
exposures' size. It is intuitive that if nancial conglomerate i 2 Vt has a low (high) level
of connectivity, i.e., a small number of degrees ki, it should have less (more) weighted-
degrees wi. The reverse is also true, the higher the number of degrees, the higher the
amount of exposures. However, a more meaningful way to determine whether there is
a relationship between degree and exposures is to investigate the relationship between
degrees ki and the mean weighted-degree wi=ki.
Hypothesis 4 (Degrees and Weighted Degrees Dependence). The the number of degrees
k and the mean weighted-degree wi=ki for i 2 Vt are not independently distributed.
There is strong evidence that we cannot reject the null hypothesis H0 that a linear
relationship between the two variables does not exist. Table 4 shows the Pearson Co-
ecient Pearson for the Brazilian network and their respective p-values, where Pearson
gauges the strength and direction of the linear relationship between these variables.
Nevertheless, just looking for linear relationships is not sucient to guarantee that de-
gree ki and the mean weighted-degree wi=ki are independently distributed, this would
only be true for a multivariate normal distribution, and the previous results show that
this is not the case.
Table 4, also shows the Kendall tau Kendall and the Spearman coecient Spearman.
On one's hand, the Kendall is a non-parametric correlation coecient that can be used
to assess correlations between the distributions of the variables, and, on the other hand,
Spearman is a rank correlation coecient and measures how well an arbitrary mono-
tonic function could describe the relationship between two random variables without
making any assumption about their distributions. The p-values for both the Spearman
10coecient and the Kendall tau test the null H0 that there is no relationship between
degree ki and the mean weighted-degree wi=ki. The results are complementary to the
Pearson Coecient Pearson, in the sense that the p-values indicate that we should re-
ject the null hypothesis for both the Spearman and Kendall, therefore, not rejecting the
alternative hypothesis Ha that there is a non-linear relationship between the number
of degrees ki and the expected exposures wi=ki. As a consequence, forasmuch there is
evidence in favor a non-linear relationship, we should consider modeling these variables
as dependently distributed. The source of this dependence appears to be represented
by a logarithmic shape between these variables.
3.5 Clustering and Assortativity
The clustering and mixing assortativity (or anity) provide aditional information about
the network representation. Following Watts and Strogatz (1998), the local clustering
coecient ci 2 [0;1] for i 2 Vt assesses the connectivity density of vertices' neighbors.
If ci = 0 then all possible vertices are directed disconnected, and if ci = 1 then all
possible vertices are directed connected. Moreover, the local clustering coecient ci of
nancial conglomerate i is the ratio of the number of directed connected neighbors of
i and the maximum possible number of connections among these neighbors given the
degree ki.
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the local clustering coecient and number
of degrees for the Brazilian interbank network. The negative slope of the plots shows
that nancial conglomerates with fewer connections (degrees) have counterparties that
are more connected to each other than nancial conglomerates with many connections.
We may appreciate this property as existence of erce competition among highly con-
nected nancial conglomerates. For example, highly connected nancial conglomerates
compete for businesses with same less connected nancial institutions, but they do
transact that much with each other. On the other hand, less connected nancial con-
glomerates tend to operate more often with each other, possible because of the lack of
power for choosing their counterparties.
The assortativity coecient measures how connected nancial conglomerates are
to other nancial conglomerates with the same properties. Therefore, we might inter-
pret mixing assortativity as a means to verify anity within nancial conglomerates,
for example, anity of degrees k or exposures `. One compelling way to calculate
mixing assortativity patterns is the approach proposed by Newman (2003), which eval-
uates linear dependence of edges' properties. Since each directed edge (i;j) 2 Et and
11i;j 2 Vt can be associated with both degrees (kin;i   1;kout;j   1) and weighted degrees
(win;i;wout;j), Newman (2003) approach for directed networks is to calculate the Pear-
son correlation of this pairs, see equations (31) and (32). As a result, the assortativity
coecient assumes values in the range  2 [ 1;1], so that in case  =  1, it means
that the network is perfectly mixing dissortative, and in case  = 1, it means that the
network is perfectly mixing assortative, and, lastly,  = 0 means that there is no clear
mixing assortative pattern.
Corroborating the clustering analysis, in the Brazilian network, the assortativity
coecient k shows that highly connected nancial conglomerates tend to be linked to
low connected nancial conglomerates, see Table 4. This property can be veried by
the signicant negative sign of the coecient for all dates k < 0, and their respective
small standard deviations. Following the same reasoning, the analysis of ` shows that
there is no clear mixing assortativity pattern. That means that nancial conglomerates
with large exposures tend to be either connected to nancial conglomerates with small
or large exposures. However, the sign ` < 0 changed over time from positive to
negative, which could also means a tendency for more concentration of exposures in
the prospective future. Merges of nancial conglomerates with large weighted degrees
in Brazil during 2008 could be the explanation for that characteristic, suggesting that
if this trend persists in the future, then nancial conglomerates with large exposures'
will be more likely to be connected to nancial conglomerates with small exposures.
4 Capital Structure
To avoid any abuse of notation, we will denote  B2 as total capital buer adjusted for
non-banking activities,  B1, Tier I capital buer adjusted for non-banking activities,
B2, total capital buer. Therefore, the bar means the necessary adjustments that will
be made for non-banking activities, see equation (9). We will still continue with the
previous notation C2 total capital, C1 tier I capital, and Cr required capital.
4.1 Cross-Sectional patterns of Capital Buer
As we point out in Section 2, Reference Capital (tier I plus tier II capitals) depends on
the Risk Base, which is a measure of risk for all operations, and not just risk generated
by interbank transactions. In this sense, Reference Capital is not a good measure
for liquidity reserves to cover interbank losses. Moreover, in Brazil, some interbank
operations do not require capital allocation, such as REPO's (repurchase agreements)
12and reverse REPO's, since the majority of these transactions are collateralized with
Brazilian government securities which are exempted from capital requirements.
Therefore, models that consider only minimum Basel ratio requirements such as
 = 0:11 in the case of Brazil are not very meaningful when we deal with contagion
under a short term perspective. Another issue are the costs involved when banks want to
increase or reduce their capital. This is more clear for banks that have shares traded in
stock exchanges. Raising money to nance capital usually required preparing nancial
statements and auditing expenses. So it is natural that banks allocate their capital in
respect to what risk they expect to bear from their current and future operations. A
more interesting way to analyze systemic risk is to consider the capital buer B as a
proxy for liquidity reserves, i.e.,
B2 = C2   Cr: (7)
Table 6 shows dierent plausible linear models for the capital buer B2 as dened
in equation (7). Although, the results contemplate pooled data from all dates, the ro-
bustness was also veried within individuals dates. The regressors that were considered
in our analysis were in-degree kin, out-degree kout, weighted in-degree win, weighted
out-degree wout, and the interaction among these variables, more especially, win  kin,
wout  kout, win  wout, and kin  kout. Initially, we consider OLS estimates for betas
coecients, given that there is no evidence that the residuals will follow a normal
distribution.
Hypothesis 5 (Capital Buer Linear Model). The weighted in-degree win is the variable
that most explains the Capital Buer B2 in a linear model.
The plausibility of these models were veried by the F-statistic p-value. Under very
small levels of signicance level all models in Figure 6 did not reject the null hypothesis
that the  coecients were jointly dierent than zero.
Nevertheless, not all the t-statics from individuals 's of each model seem to be
signicantly dierent than zero. For example, models 3 and 4, which do not include
exposures as regressors, suggest that the constant is not dierent than zero. In addition,
interaction between degrees and exposures usually have p-values for the t-statistics
greater than 1%, except for model 14, giving evidence that interaction doesn't improve
the regression substantially.
Moreover, the R2 shows that there are models that explain more than others. Ex-
cept for models 2, 3 and 4, all models have a very similar R2 ranging around 0.44.
13Nonetheless, model 1 which is very parsimonious, considers only one regressor, i.e., the
weighted in-degree win and it has approximately the same explanatory power of all
other competing models. This means that including other variables is actually not very
helpful. From the R2 of models 1 and 2, it is clear that weighted out-degree wout have
little relevance in explaining capital buer B2, while the weighted in-degree seems to
dominate the set of relevant information.
From the Akaike (AIC) and the Bayesian (BIC) Information Criteria, see respec-
tively Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978), we can corroborate that models 1 and 10
represent the best model alternatives. However, as pointed earlier, not all 's from
from model 10 could be considered signicantly dierent than zero. Since the BIC
penalizes the inclusion of more regressors, and both the R2 and the adjusted R2 are
very close to those of model 1, we have that model 1 is the most parsimonious model.
In view of these facts, we select model 1 as the most appropriate for modeling the
behavior of capital buer B2, i.e.,
B2;i = 0 + 1  win;i + "i: (8)
Model 1 also has a meaningful economic interpretation. It would be natural to expect
that capital buer B2 depends on the weighted in-degree, since this is the main coun-
terparty source of risk. A nancial conglomerate with have higher level of weighted
in-degree win will be more susceptible to their conterparties because the eect in term
of losses in case some of them default is likely to be greater. On the other hand, it is
natural that out-exposures and out-degree will play no role in the allocation of resources
to capital buer, since there is no counterparty risk in this exposures for the nancial
conglomerate.
On this ground, the greater the number of counterparties (in-degrees) ki and the
higher the average weighted in-degree wi=ki, the higher the weighted in-degree wi will be
for nancial conglomerate i and, consequently, the greater the amount of resources will
be allocated for capital buer. Surprisingly, model 1 shows that, if banks i and j have
the same level of connectivity in terms of in-degree ki = kj, and the same amount of
weighted in-degree wi = wj, but bank i is mainly concentrated to only one counterparty,
while bank j has even exposures to all its counterparties, they will allocate the same
amount of capital buer regardless that bank i seems to be riskier, these structures will
have dierent impact on systemic risk.
The OLS estimates for the parameters were 0 = 50:8826 and 1 = 0:1887. 0 means
that independent of the size of the nancial conglomerate, it will have minimum capital
14buer to operate a banking business of BRL 50.9 million of BRL, and 1 indicates that
for each BRL of weighted in-degree the bank will allocate BRL 0.1887 to its capital
buer. Figure 9 (upper left plot) shows the regression plot of the model 1 described in
equation (8).
4.2 Distribution of Residuals and Leverage
The residuals of the model presented in equation (8) can be viewed as shocks in the
capital buer B2. Since nancial conglomerates are dynamic entities, the remaining
capital buer that is not explained by the linear model in equation (8) can be understood
as resources allocated to capital buer to cover risks associated with their non-banking
operations. The shocks "i seem to be generated by a distribution with fat tails.



























where  is the location parameter,  > 0 is the scale parameter, 0 <  < 1 is the shape
parameter, and   is the Gamma function  (z) =
R 1
0 z 1e d.
Figure 9 (upper right plot) shows the Normal Probability plot for the tted residuals
^ "i for i 2 Vt. The 45 line represents the cumulative distribution of a standard normal
distribution. It is clear that the fat tails are relevant in the analysis. On the other hand,
the tted residuals show a behavior similar to the Scaled t-student distribution. The
parameters of the distribution were obtained numerically maximizing the log-likelihood
function. In addition, under high levels of signicance the Komolgorov-Smirnov test
p-value (0.42) gives strong evidences that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
liquidity shocks follows a Scaled t-student distribution.
Moreover, Figure 9 (upper left plot and lower plots) provides enough evidence that
 < 1. Both the MLE estimate for the parameter  = 0:5962 and the hill estimator of
the tail exponent  = 0:7260 corroborate that the tail behavior has an exponent index
less than one. Remark that we calculated the Hill estimator following the approach
presented by Resnick (2006), Section 4.4. The heavy tail of the scaled t-student distri-
bution has to be analyzed carefully, especially in the context of OLS regression, where
the residuals mean and variance must be nite, i.e., E(") < 1 and 2(") < 1. This
is clearly not the case when  < 1, since the scaled t-distribution will not have a well
15dened mean E(") and its variance will be innite 2(") = 1. As a consequence we
could not guarantee that the 's for the regression models presented in Table 6 would
be stable in terms of consistency. However, this seem to be case, since after regressing
the same models in Table 6 via MLE considering the scaled t-distribution we nd very
similar values for the 's providing evidence of the robustness of the results for the OLS
estimators.
Furthermore, if we rewrite equation (8) as
B2;i   0
win;i
= 1 +  "i; (10)
where  "i = "i=win;i then we could interpret 1 as the leverage coecient. Adopting the
same modus operandi we nd that leverage also follows a student t-scaled distribution
and its tail coecient  = 0:6966 is less then one. Since the coecient does't change
this provides additional evidence for the scaled t-student distribution not just for the
leverage but also for the model presented in equation (8).
5 Systemic Risk
As we noted before, supervisory agencies, such as central banks, demand that nancial
conglomerates maintain minimum capital requirements. Therefore, if a nancial con-
glomerate shows a Basel Index smaller than what was established, then it is susceptible





where the Risk Base was dened in equation (1). For the Brazilian case  = 0:11 and
for the United States nancial system  = 0:08. There is a strong connection between
the Basel Index IBasel and the capital buer B2. Since they both depend on the same
variables, you may also state an equivalent condition in terms of capital buer B2, i.e.,
B2 > 0: (12)
It is important to remark that capital and exposures should represent the same basis
of assets. Since we have considered only interbank exposures in our matrix Lt, then
the capital buer should be calculated accordingly. Since capital are only required for
in-exposures, an interesting approach should be adjust the required capital for these
16sources of risk. Therefore, our capital buer will only represent all capital available to
absorb losses not related to non-banking exposures.
Denition 1 (Capital Buer). The capital buer of nancial institution i 2 Vt is
dened as




In this sense, capital buer will represent all required capital for banking expo-
sures (interbank exposures) and any discretionary additional capital that the nancial
conglomerate management considers necessary.
Therefore, in our model we will establish that a nancial conglomerate is not in
condition to absorb losses spilled over from its exposures if the nancial conglomerate
is not well capitalized. Although the terminology may be used in dierent contexts, we
will dene this situation as a default.
Denition 2 (Default). A nancial conglomerate i 2 Vt is in default if the banking
capital buer is negative, i.e.,
 B2;i < 0: (14)
In the Brazilian case, this situation could mean, in extreme cases, the intervention in
the nancial conglomerate's management or liquidation of its assets by Banco Central
do Brasil.
5.1 Contagion via Default
A contagion model is concerned with risk propagation. This means that when a nancial
conglomerate defaults, a natural question arises: What would be the impact of this
default to other nancial conglomerates?
To answer this question, it is important to notice that exposures don't represent
cash ows until they are due. Therefore, a realistic approach is to consider losses as
write-os to the capital buer, which is in accordance to banking practices. If in time
t, nancial conglomerate j has good reason to believe that its counterparty i will not
honor exposure `ij when it is due, then, in time t, nancial conglomerate i has to write-
o exposure `ij from its asset portfolio, and this procedure will negatively aect its
capital buer in the same amount. As a consequence from the initial defaulting state,
some nancial conglomerates in i 2 Vt could also default in the subsequent state, and
this process of defaulting nancial conglomerates causing other nancial conglomerates
17to default could go on for several rounds (defaulting states) until the system achieves
an equilibrium (nal state). Clearly, write-os will drive the default mechanism of our
contagion model.









represent the nancial conglomerates in default in state s, where  B
(s)
2;i for all i 2 Vt










where s + 1 is the subsequent state.
Note that the our analysis comprises a short-term perspective, where the nancial
institution is required to write-o the losses in its nancial reports, but has no sucient
time to recover some of all of its losses. This doesn't mean that the nancial institution
will not take advantage of any legal procedure it has to execute liens and guarantees.
On the other hand, it is easy to generalize the above equation rewriting the right-hand
sided term as
P
j2D(s)(1 rj)`ij, where rj is the recovery rate for nancial conglomerate
j. From Denition 3, it is possible to calculate the contagion impact of each nancial
conglomerate. The contagion impact is the sum of the losses suered by all nancial
conglomerates within a nancial system given that a set of nancial conglomerates
default. Initially, we arbitrarily established a set of defaulting nancial conglomerates






where the superscript indicates that D
(s)
0 will depend on the choice of the initial set
D0. If we choose a nonempty set D0 6= ;, then, according to the write-o procedure,
nancial conglomerates 
 n D0 will suer losses, and their capital buers in the next
state will be given by
 B
(1)








Then on the next state s = 1, some nancial conglomerates in 











and, as a consequence, new losses will be incurred by nancial system. This processes












Consequently, the dynamics presented through equations (17), (18), (19) and (20) will
represent our contagion mechanism, which is similar to the one presented in Mistrulli
(2007), Cont and Moussa (2009), however adapted to our context.
Suppose we choose that our initial defaulting set comprises only one nancial con-
glomerate, i.e., D0 = fjg for one j 2 Vt, then it is possible to verify how much losses
other nancial conglomerates will suer and eventually come up with the most conta-
gious nancial conglomerate in the system.
Denition 4 (Default Impact). The default impact DIj of nancial conglomerate j 2





















given that the initial defaulting set is D0 = fjg.
From this denition it is clear that a nancial conglomerate cannot lose more than
its capital, and that the DIj is the sum of the losses suered by the system, in case
nancial conglomerate j defaults, expressed as a percentage of the total capitalization of
the system. Therefore, DIj 2 [0;1] for j 2 Vt represents the percentage of capitalization
that is destroyed if bank j defaults. From a regulatory agency perspective the DI
is an important measure because it shows both which nancial conglomerates poses
more risk to the system stability and how the losses propagates throughout nancial
conglomerates, helping these agencies to allocate their resources in the supervision of
the most riskier nancial conglomerates.
Figure 8 (lower left plot) shows the histogram of the DI distribution. It is possible
to notice that there is an exponential shape, which means that most of the nancial
institutions will destroy not more than 4% of the system capitalization. However, there
are few nancial institutions which are very risky, that could destroy as much as 15%
of the system capitalization. We argue that central banks should focus its eorts in
19supervising those more risky nancial conglomerates in terms of DI.
5.2 Market and Credit Risks
Following the terminology presented by Bandt and Hartmann (2000), it would be in-
teresting to introduce an index for the systemic risk that considers not only contagion
such as the DI but also systemic events, such as exogenous shocks that incorporates
market and credit information that could aect the capital buer of all nancial con-
glomerates at the same time. We will follow the idea proposed by Cont and Moussa
(2009), however adapted to the results presented in Subsection 4.2.
Denition 5 (Systemic Risk Index). The Systemic Risk Index of nancial conglomerate





i j  B2;i + i"i < 0

(22)
where the Default Impact DI"
i is computed considering capital buer after the eects of
exogenous shock "i and i is a scale factor to adjust the exogenous shocks for the credit
risk.
Following this denition the SIi is the expected contagion loss considering scenarios
where capital buer of nancial conglomerate i is wiped out by systemic events. Re-
mark that the exogenous shocks will comprise the market and credit risk information.
Let u1;u2;:::;ui;:::;unt be a sequence of correlated uniform random variables.3 Lehar
(2005) gives estimates for volatilities and correlations of assets of international banks.
Following his estimates, we considered a correlation coecient of 0.4 for the uniform
sequence. From the uniform sequence we generate a sequence of heavy tail random vari-
ables "1;"2;:::;"i;:::;"nt obtained from the inverse of the cumulative density function
of the scaled student distribution with parameters given by the MLE estimates found
in Subsection 4.2.
Although the moments are not well dened when the tail exponent is less than 1,
the cumulative density function F is well established, and therefore we can nd i, such
3One easy way to obtain a sequence of correlated uniforms is generating a sequence of nt + 1 IID
standard normal N(0;1) random variables, such as z0;z1;:::;znt. Let  be the desired correlation








for i = 1;:::nt, where  is the cumulative density function of a standard normal distribution. In this
case z0 could be interpreted as the systemic event and zi the eects of systemic events on individuals
nancial conglomerates.
20that the cumulative density function matches the probability of default i of nancial
conglomerate i. Since the condition  B2;i + i"i < 0 is equivalent to "i <    B2;i=i,

















To compute the Systemic Risk Index given by equation (22), we consider Monte
Carlo simulation with 10,000 number of iterations and applied the Importance Sampling
to improve the performance of the algorithm, see for example Asmussen and Glynn
(2007), Chapter V. Moreover, the probabilities of default  were basically obtained
from credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch Ratings.
Figure 8 (upper left plot) shows the histogram of the SI distribution. It is possible to
notice the log normal shape of the distribution with a positive skewness. The skewness
suggests heterogeneity among the SI of Brazilian nancial conglomerates, and could
be explained mainly by the fat tails of the scaled student distribution and idiosyncratic
probabilities of default, respectively, representing market and credit risk factors. In
addition, we have that a mode within the range of 15% to 20% which is relatively
higher then the DI. Following the same analysis, there are few nancial institutions
which are very risky, that could destroy as much as 40% of the system capitalization.
5.3 Liquidity Eect
Besides market and credit risks, during nancial crisis, systemic events are reinforced by
lack of liquidity. Therefore, liquidity risk plays a crucial role in the analysis of systemic
risk under stress conditions. Encompassing liquidity risk in our analysis can be easily
accomplished by considering capital buer of nancial conglomerates in terms of tier I
capital C1. This is equivalent to substituting the Reference Capital C2 to only tier I
capital C1, yielding capital buer equal to




The idea behind this analysis is to consider only capital that can be redeemed at the
option of the the nancial institution shareholders. Therefore, tier I capital is the only
capital that is really under the nancial management's control, and, consequently the
only instrument available to manage liquidity and leverage, especially during crisis.
Accordingly, we share the view that tier I capital is a conservative way to measure the
21bank's nancial strength from a regulator's point of view. This view is also shared by
representatives of other governmental and non-governmental regulatory organizations,
such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and Financial Services Authority
(FSA) representatives, see Cox (2008). In this framework, tier I capital C1 is seen as a
metric of permanent capital which yields a better measurement of the banks' available
capital to absorb losses in the short term, that is, in a going-concern perspective.
Figure 8 (upper and lower right plots) shows respectively the histogram of the SI
and DI distributions considering the stressed scenario where nancial conglomerates
can rely only on tier I capital. The shape of the distribution are clearly the same as if
there was no liquidity risk, notwithstanding, we can notice that the distributions shift
in time. It would be natural to expect that the most right histogram would indicate
periods where liquidity matters, such as crises. This is exactly what we observe for both
the SI and DI. The left most histogram represents the data from June/2007 and the
right most histogram is the June/2008, where the former could be associated with the
development phase of the nancial in the United States where negative news from bond
and credit markets were aecting investors condence and the latter date is associated
with the apogeu of the same crises where banks such as Lemon Brothers and Merrill
Lynch led for bankruptcy and Citibank were suering losses and liquidity diculties.In
addition, we have that in June/2008, the Systemic Risk Index SI comprised nancial
conglomerates that could destroy the nancial system capitalization as much as double
what would be destroyed without liquidity eects, that is 80%, and for the Default
Impact DI this were even more dramatic, indicating destruction as much as six times
if liquidity risk were not taken in consideration.
6 Conclusions
In the preceding sections, we explore the structure and dynamics of interbank exposures
using a unique data set of all exposures of nancial institutions in Brazil, as well as their
capital reserves, at various periods in 2007 and 2008. We also explore the relationship
between connectivity of a node and its capital buer. We have tried to present, in
some detail, a set of statistical facts which emerge from the empirical study of an
interbank network topology. The properties mentioned here are model free in the sense
that they do not result from a parametric hypothesis on the network topology but
from rather general hypothesis of qualitative nature. As such, they should be viewed
as constraints that a random graph describing the behavior of an interbank network
22has to verify in order to reproduce the statistical properties of the network accurately.
Unfortunately, most currently existing models fail to reproduce all these statistical
features at once, showing that they are indeed very constraining. Nevertheless, it
seems that an interesting model that could actually and adequately capture most of
these properties adequately would be a directed scale-free (weighted) graph with heavy-
tailed degree and weighted distributions.
Finally, we should point out several issues we have not discussed here. One impor-
tant question is whether these properties are relevant from an economic point of view.
In other words, can these empirical facts be used to conrm or rule out certain modeling
approaches used in economic theory? Another question is whether these empirical facts
are useful from a supervisory agency perspective, such as central banks. For exam-
ple, does the presence of heavy tail distributions in connectivity and exposures imply
more systemic risk and eventually more capital requirements. Maybe the answer to this
question is yes, but we have not explored this subject closely to withdraw any scientic
conclusions. In addition, we have not explored the eects of using estimation technics
for the data base, such as minimum entropy, and how these methods can be used to
complete a data set without losing the statistical properties veried in this paper. We
leave these questions for future research.
7 Appendix
7.1 Maximum likelihood estimates
According to Clauset et al. (2009), the likelihood function for the joint estimates of the
parameters of the discrete power law random variables is given by
(^ ;^ kmin) = argmax
(


















where 0(^ ;^ kmin) and 00(^ ;^ kmin) are respectively the rst and second derivatives of
zeta function  in respect to ^ .
23Similarly, the likelihood function of the joint estimate of the parameters of the
continuous power law random variable is given by

















and the error of ^  is equal to
(^ ) =





Following Newman (2003), we have that the assortativity coecient for the pairs
e
(i;j)




y;` = (win;i;wout;j); (30)
















































































where y = 1;:::;Et is the enumeration of edges and Et = #f(i;j) 2 Etg, and the







where y is the value of  in case we exclude edge ey from the network.
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29In-Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
^ E(Kin) 8.6 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.0 7.9 8.6
^ (Kin) 10.8 10.9 10.6 11.2 11.3 11.0 11.0
min(kin) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
max(kin) 54 54 51 57 60 62 56.3




0.4887 0.4692 0.4756 0.5336 0.4722 0.4417 0.4802
^ kMLE
in;min 6 13 7 21 6 5 9.7
Out-Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
^ E(Kout) 8.6 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.0 7.9 8.6
^ (Kout) 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.4 9.4 8.8 9.0
min(kout) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0
max(kout) 36 37 39 41 39 44 39.3




0.6359 0.5914 0.4884 0.4384 0.4174 0.4955 0.5112
^ kMLE
out;min 5 15 16 12 9 11 11.3
Degree Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
^ E(K) 17.1 17.2 17.5 18.0 18.0 15.8 17.3
^ (K) 17.5 17.5 17.5 18.2 18.6 18.3 17.9
min(k) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.0
max(k) 86 87 80 87 90 106 89.3




0.5222 0.4767 0.4834 0.4124 0.4394 0.3580 0.4487
^ kMLE
min 17 34 12 15 12 10 16.7
Exposures* Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08 Mean
^ E(L) 1,214.8 872.5 914.3 954.0 977.1 1,364.8 1,049.6
^ (L) 3,785.5 1,952.6 2,029.6 2,018.3 2,309.9 3,565.7 2,610.2
min(`) 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2
max(`) 30,106.6 12,874.9 12,979.5 12,863.2 15,814.1 23,664.9 18,050.5




0.0260 0.6000 0.2140 0.6920 0.3840 0.9820 0.4830
^ `MLE
min 39.5 74.0 80.0 101.7 93.4 336.7 120.9
*values in millions of BRL (Brazilian Reals)
Table 3: General statistics and MLE estimates for the power law distribution param-
eters: tail exponent , minimum tail value for in-degree kin;min, out-degree kout;min,




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34kin vs. win=kin Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Pearson 0.0381 -0.0353 -0.0410 -0.0359 -0.0379 -0.0303
(p-value) (0.6900) (0.7082) (0.6724) (0.7047) (0.6915) (0.7523)
Kendall 0.2839 0.2554 0.2294 0.2648 0.2409 0.2144
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0013)
Spearman 0.3907 0.3508 0.3109 0.3642 0.3328 0.2876
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0022)
kout vs. wout=kout Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Pearson 0.0315 0.2456 0.2415 0.2543 0.2302 0.0200
(p-value) (0.7402) (0.0104) (0.0126) (0.0071) (0.0137) (0.8301)
Kendall 0.2728 0.2807 0.3143 0.3274 0.3440 0.3025
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Spearman 0.3787 0.3969 0.4329 0.4562 0.4704 0.4241
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
k vs. w Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
Pearson -0.0130 -0.0573 -0.0607 -0.0531 -0.0539 -0.0280
(p-value) (0.8854) (0.5270) (0.5085) (0.55610 (0.5489) (0.7552)
Kendall 0.2460 0.2487 0.2179 0.2378 0.2386 0.2309
(p-value) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Spearman 0.3370 0.3550 0.3086 0.3337 0.3336 0.3329
(p-value) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Table 4: Brazilian interbank network: Pearson Pearson, Kendall Kendall and Spearman
Spearman coecients for in-degree kin vs. in-exposures win, out-degree kout vs. out-
exposures wout, and degree k vs. exposures w.
Jun-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Nov-08
k -0.2546 -0.2870 -0.2783 -0.2972 -0.3207 -0.3548
2(k) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
` 0.0262 0.0070 0.0115 -0.0196 -0.0102 -0.0578
2(`) 0.0019 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0012 0.0009
E(c) 0.1759 0.1718 0.1745 0.1774 0.1960 0.1951
d 2.7043 2.7103 2.7313 2.6651 2.6460 2.6618
Table 5: Brazilian interbank network: assortativity coecient for adjacency matrix
k and for exposure matrix `, their respectives variances 2(k) and 2(`), global
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